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Introduction
In June 1966, Vivian Marie Thompson, a nineteen year old
single mother of one child and pregnant with her second, moved
from Dorchester, Massachusetts to Hartford, Connecticut.' There,
Vivian moved in with her mother. 2 However, her mother was not
able to support Vivian and her child for very long, and in August
1966 Vivian moved into her own apartment in Hartford. 3 Her
pregnancy precluded her from working or participating in a work
training program, and so she was forced to file for Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC) assistance. 4 In November, she
was informed by the Connecticut Welfare Department that her
application for AFDC had been denied. 5 The sole basis for the
denial was that Vivian had not lived in Connecticut for one year
before her application was filed. 6 Vivian's story, from the U.S.
Supreme Court case Shapiro v. Thompson,7 is one of thousands of
8
stories of people impacted by durational residency requirements.
Transcending political boundaries, welfare reform efforts
David A. Donahue, Penalizing the Poor:DurationalResidency Requirements
for Welfare Benefits, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 451, 464 (1998) (discussing the U.S.
Supreme Court's retreat from traditional rational basis review in Zobel v. Williams,
457 U.S. 55 (1982)).
-J.D. expected 2000, University of Minnesota Law School. B.A. 1996, Macalester
College. The author would like to thank editors Paula Brummel, Jill Robertson,
Sarah Bigler, and Nina Mojiri-Azad for their assistance with this Article, and
especially David Moeller for his ceaseless support and understanding.
1. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 623 (1969).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
8. See discussion infra Part I.
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have created durational residency requirements, 9 which limit
welfare benefits based on the length of a recipient's residence in a
particular state. 10 While legislators have asserted numerous
purposes for durational residency requirements," one often
unvoiced but apparent purpose is to discourage indigent persons
12
from moving to a particular state.
Although the Supreme Court in 1969 held that durational
residency
requirements
are
unconstitutional, 13 Congress
effectively trumped that ruling with the Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) in 1996,
allowing states to impose certain types of durational residency
requirements. 14
As states followed Congress' lead, enacting
durational residency requirements for welfare benefits, 15 groups
and individuals concerned with poverty issues and individuals
dependent on welfare benefits once again raised the subject of
durational residency requirements with the courts. 16
The
Supreme Court most recently revisited the issue in Saenz v. Roe.17
This Article suggests that the Supreme Court's traditional
approach to deciding durational residency requirements, while
producing a sound moral outcome, is legally flawed and ultimately
9. See Brenna Binns, Fencing Out the Poor: The Constitutionalityof Residency
Requirements in Welfare Reform, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 1255, 1258-60, 1270-71 (tracing
the history of welfare in the United States and commenting on the bipartisan
nature of welfare reform).
10. See Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 622-27 (describing the structure of durational
residency requirements in Connecticut, the District of Columbia, and
Pennsylvania, which denied new residents welfare benefits during their first year).
11. See id. at 628-38 (cataloguing the purported purposes for durational
residency requirements in Connecticut, the District of Columbia and
Pennsylvania); infra notes 35-40 and accompanying text (detailing the Supreme
Court's analysis of how residency requirements infringe upon the fundamental
right to travel).
12. See Binns, supra note 9, at 1271 ('This goal is based on the belief that the
poor are motivated principally by higher benefits, and by fears that the state will
be labeled a 'welfare magnet' should it continue to provide comprehensive public
assistance.").
13. See Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 638 (holding that durational residency
requirements that deny benefits unless applicants have resided in the state for one
year are unconstitutional).
14. See 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1998); infra notes 101-103 and accompanying text
(discussing a durational residency provision of PRWORA that allowed states to
limit welfare benefits for the first year of a newcomer's residency to the amount
they would have received in their prior state of residence).
15. See Binns, supra note 9, at 1270 ('Even before federal welfare reform won
approval in August 1996, virtually every state had proposed welfare reform."); infra
notes 108-113 and accompanying text (providing examples of such state
legislation).
16. See discussion infra Part I.D.
17. 119 S.Ct. 1518 (1999).
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does more to harm than good to strengthen welfare rights. Part I
traces the history of durational residency requirement
jurisprudence in the Supreme Court,' 8 focusing especially on the
landmark Shapiro v. Thompson case, 19 as well as the recently
decided Saenz case. 20 Part I also examines the Shapiro progeny
and the traditional basis for deciding durational residency
requirement cases. 21 Part II analyzes the direction the Supreme
Court has taken in its line of durational residency requirement
opinions. 22 Finally, Part III proposes that the Court adopt a new
approach to deciding durational residency requirement casesabandon the constitutional right to travel, and turn from strict
23
scrutiny to rational basis review.
I. The History of Durational Residency Requirements
From the welfare rights movements of the 1960s and 1970s to
the welfare reform of the 1990s, the question of how to distribute
welfare benefits has loomed large in politicians' minds. 24
Discussions on the topic and attempts at reform have been fueled
by many factors, including compassion, sympathy and loathing. 25
These discussions have created a fear that certain states will
become "welfare magnets," hypothetical states whose welfare
benefits are so attractive that they become a sort of promised land
for indigent families.2 6 While it is not clear that the phenomenon
of "welfare magnets" actually exists, 27 the fear of becoming a
18. See infra notes 24-150 and accompanying text.
19. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
20. 119 S.Ct. 1518 (1999).
21. See infranotes 63- 100 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 151-198 and accompanying text.
23. See infranotes 199-241 and accompanying text.
24. See Opinion of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 257 N.E.2d 94
(Mass. 1970) (issuing advisory opinion counseling against enactment of a
durational residency requirement in light of Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969); see also MINN. STAT. § 2565.12 (1997) (creating a post-welfare reform
durational residency requirement).
25. See Patricia Edmonds, States Turn Values Rhetoric into Legislative Action,
USA TODAY, Aug. 8, 1996, at A7 (quoting Tommy Thompson, Governor of
Wisconsin, saying that welfare reform law "set[s] a moral tone for our society"); see
also Matthew Adler, What States Owe Outsiders, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 391,
391-93 (1993) (rejecting what he terms the "parochialist" viewpoint that states
should give zero weight to the well being of non-residents).
26. See Paul E. Peterson, Devolution's Price, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 111, 116-17
(1996) (defining welfare magnets as "places that attract poor people because they
offer higher cash benefits than other states").
27. See Institute for Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin, Urban
Immigration: State of Wisconsin and Dane County 1-7 (1991) (concluding from
statistical data on welfare migration that higher welfare benefits did not translate
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welfare magnet led states to create durational residency
requirements to keep indigent newcomers off the welfare rolls for
some set period of time after they moved into a new state. 28 The
durational residency requirements, however, were not met placidly
by all newcomers, and the first round of legal challenges emerged
29
in the 1960s.
A. Shapiro v. Thompson
In 1969, statutes from Connecticut, the District of Columbia
and Pennsylvania denied welfare benefits to any person who had
lived in the state or district for less than one year before applying
for welfare. 30 The U.S. Supreme Court in Shapiro held that these
durational residency requirements for receipt of welfare benefits
were unconstitutional. 31 The Court struck down the statutes for
two reasons. First, the Court attacked the residency requirements
on equal protection grounds. 32 The requirements, it held, created
two classes of indigent families: indigent families who had lived in
the state for a year or more, and indigent families who had lived in
the state for less than a year.33 The Court ruled that such a
34
distinction was impermissible.

into more welfare applicants moving into a state); see also Gary Blair, Suit Alleges
Minnesota Residency Requirements for Welfare Eligibility Unconstitutional,OJIBWE
NEWS, Oct. 17, 1997, at 1 ([Clonclusions of several studies indicate people come to
Minnesota mostly for reasons that have nothing to do with welfare. 'They come for
jobs, they come to join family, they come to escape domestic abuse, or they come for
better schools."'). But see PAUL E. PETERSON ET AL., WELFARE MAGNETS: A NEW
CASE FOR A NATIONAL STANDARD (1990) (advocating the creation of a national
welfare standard to combat the problem of welfare magnets).
28. See Binns, supra note 9, at 1257 ('Federal welfare reform that transfers
responsibility for welfare administration to the states, state-level reforms aimed at
reducing benefit eligibility, and public outcry over perceived welfare migration are
strong arguments in favor of a state's interest in controlling the number of poor on
the welfare rolls.").
29. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (holding unconstitutional
durational residency requirements denying welfare benefits to indigent newcomers
for the first year they lived in a new state).
30. See id. at 622-23 (describing the Connecticut durational residency
requirement); id. at 623-25 (describing the District of Columbia requirement); id. at
625-26 (describing the Pennsylvania requirement).
31. See id. at 638 (holding that durational residency requirements violate the
Equal Protection Clause and the constitutional right to travel).
32. See id. at 633 (finding that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits an
"apportionment of state services" between newer and older residents).
33. See id. at 627 (rejecting this distinction as a permissible basis for the state's
requirements).
34. See id. at 632 ("We have difficulty seeing how long-term residents who
qualify for welfare are making a greater present contribution to the State in taxes
than indigent residents who have recently arrived.").
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Second, the Court examined the constitutional right to
travel. 35
The question was whether durational residency
requirements for welfare benefits impermissibly burdened this
right.36 The Court classified the right to travel as a fundamental
right 37 and pointed to the right's long history in American
jurisprudence. 38 The Court held that indigent families moving
from state to state were exercising their constitutional right to
travel. 39 Because the right to travel is a fundamental right, the
Court applied strict scrutiny to the Connecticut, District of
Columbia, and Pennsylvania durational residency requirement
statutes to determine whether they violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 40
Under strict scrutiny, the states had to show that the
durational residency requirements furthered a compelling state
interest. 4 1
The Court quickly struck down statutes with
durational residency requirements designed to curb state funds for
welfare benefits, or to deter indigent families from moving into a
state. 42 The states in Shapiro then offered four alternative
justifications: 43 (1) that the durational residency requirements
allow the states to predict and plan for their welfare budgets; 44 (2)
that the requirements give decision-makers an objective standard
35. See id. at 634.
36. See id. (setting forth the test that a classification which penalizes the right
to travel is unconstitutional if it does not serve a compelling state interest).

37. See BLACKS' LAW DICTIONARY 465 (6th ed. 1991):
[Fundamental rights are tihose rights which have their source, and are
explicitly or implicitly guaranteed, in the federal Constitution and state
constitutions....
Challenged legislation that significantly burdens a
'fundamental right... will be reviewed under a stricter standard of
review. A law will be held violative of the due process clause if it is not
closely tailored to promote a compelling or overriding interest of
government.
38. See Shapiro,394 U.S. at 630 (quoting the Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 492
(1849)). The Court stated that:
for all the great purposes for which the Federal government was formed,
we are one people, with one common country. We are all citizens of the
United States; and, as members of the same community, must have the
right to pass and repass through every part of it without interruption, as
freely as in our own States.
Id.
39. See id. at 634 ("[l1n moving from State to State or to the District of
Columbia [the indigent persons] were exercising a constitutional right[.]").
40. See id. at 638 (determining the constitutionality of durational residency
requirements by whether or not they promote a compelling state interest).
41. See id.
42. See id. at 633 (finding that these were not constitutionally permissible state
purposes).
43. See id. at 633-34.
44. See id.
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by which to judge whether someone is a qualified resident;45 (3)
that the requirements significantly reduce the possibility for
fraud;46 and (4) that denying welfare benefits for one year upon
entering the state provides an incentive for new residents to enter
48
the workforce. 47 The Court struck down each of these rationales.
In response to the argument that states needed durational
residency requirements to plan yearly budgets, the Court pointed
out that neither Connecticut, the District of Columbia nor
Pennsylvania had shown any evidence that they actually used the
purpose. 49
for this
requirements
residency
durational
Furthermore, the Court found it highly unlikely that any state
would actually go to the lengths necessary to utilize durational
residency requirements in this way.SO Thus, the Court held that
the states could not use budgetary concerns as their "compelling
5

interest." 1

Using durational residency requirements to determine bona
fide residency was, in the Court's view, simply illogical-the two
were completely distinct concepts. 52 Less drastic means than
durational residency requirements existed for preventing
fraudulent receipt of benefits from more than one state. 53 And if
providing incentives to enter the workforce was the goal of
durational residency requirements, then the states should
institute a one-year waiting period for any person who applied for
welfare, newcomer or not. 54 Since the states were not able to
45. See id.
46. See id. (discarding the states' reasoning that if indigent persons were

allowed to move from state to state and collect full benefits at will, the frequency of
fraud through collection of double payments would be high).
47. See id.
48. See id. at 634-35 (striking down budget predictability justification); id. at
636 (striking down objective residency standard justification); id. at 637 (rejecting
prevention of fraudulent benefits receipt justification and justification of
encouraging new residents to join the work force).
49. See id. at 634 ('The records in all three cases are utterly devoid of evidence
that either State or the District of Columbia in fact uses the one-year requirement
as a means to predict the number of people who will require assistance in the
budget year.").
50. See id. at 635 (pointing to other methods of determining budgetary needs
which the states themselves conceded would be more accurate than the durational
residency requirements).
51. See id. at 634 (finding this proffered justification "wholly unfounded").
52. See id. at 636 (remarking that bona-fide residency and living in a state for
one year were not the same thing).
53. See id. at 637 (suggesting alternatives such as cooperation among different
states' welfare departments).
54. See id. (positing that if the states really wanted to encourage participation
in the labor force, they would impose a one-year waiting period on any new
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advance any interest which could be accepted as compelling, the
Court found that the durational residency requirements did not
meet strict scrutiny and must be struck down. 55 The Court also
said that none of these state interests would satisfy even a
traditional rational basis review, but that strict scrutiny was
nonetheless the correct standard to apply since the fundamental
right to interstate travel was involved. 56 The Court also implied
that not all durational residency requirements would constitute an
57
impermissible penalty on the right to travel.
Perhaps most significant for the current situation, the
Shapiro Court commented on the federal government's role in
durational residency requirements. 58 In Shapiro, the states
argued that durational residency requirements should be
permissible because Congress had included a provision regarding
waiting periods in AFDC legislation. 59 The Court, however, found
this a weak argument. 60 First, the Court ruled that Congress had
not called for durational residency requirements in its
legislation.6 1 Second, the Court clarified that even if Congress had
applicant for welfare, regardless of how long they had lived in the state).
55. See id. at 638 (finding that the durational residency requirements did not
withstand strict scrutiny).
56. See id. ('[E]ven under traditional equal protection tests a classification of
welfare applicants according to whether they have lived in the State for one year
would seem irrational and unconstitutional.").
57. See id. at 638. The Court stated in a footnote as follows:
We imply no view of the validity of waiting-period or residence
requirements determining eligibility to vote, eligibility for tuition-free
education, to obtain a license to practice a profession, to hunt or fish, and
so forth. Such requirements may promote compelling state interests on
the one hand, or, on the other, may not be penalties upon the exercise of
the constitutional right of interstate travel.
Id. at 638 n.21. The Court did, however, address some of these other areas in later
cases. See infra notes 64-95 and accompanying text.
58. See Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 638-41.
59. See id. at 638 (turning to Connecticut and Pennsylvania's argument that
their actions were sanctioned by Congress); see also Social Security Act of 1935, 42
U.S.C. § 602(b) (1994) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 607 ( Supp. IV 1998)). The
Act reads in pertinent part:
The Secretary shall approve any [state assistance] plan which fulfills the
conditions specified... except that he shall not approve any plan which
imposes as a condition of eligibility for aid to families with dependent
children, a residence requirement which denies aid with respect to any
child residing in the State (1) who has resided in the State for one year
immediately preceding the application for such aid ....
42 U.S.C. § 602(b). AFDC, which is what the Court dealt with in Shapiro, has been
replaced by the PRWORA. See 42 U.S.C. § 607.
60. See Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 639-41 (noting that states cannot merely hide
behind Congress to justify their actions).
61. See id. at 639 ("On its face, the statute does not approve, much less
prescribe, a one-year requirement. It merely directs the Secretary of Health,
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done so, the mere fact that Congress has created legislation does
not redeem an otherwise unconstitutional penalty on a
62
constitutional right.
B.

Durational Residency Requirements and the Right to
Travel Post-Shapiro

Shapiro was not the first case in which the Supreme Court
addressed the right to interstate travel or residency
requirements 6 3-nor was it to be the last. Between Shapiro and
welfare reform in 1996, the Supreme Court dealt with durational
residency requirements and the constitutional right to travel on
64
seven occasions.
Three years after Shapiro, the Supreme Court began to
address additional areas in which durational residency
requirements might be used. 65 In Dunn v. Blumstein,66 the Court
found that in determining whether a law violates the Equal
Protection Clause, one of two standards of review may be used,
depending on the nature of the right affected.6 7 The Court
reaffirmed that the right to travel was a fundamental right and
Education, and Welfare not to disapprove plans submitted by the States because
they include such a requirement.").
62. See id. at 641 ("Congress may not authorize the States to violate the Equal
Protection Clause.").
63. See, e.g., United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-60 (1966) (finding
actions against Black travelers constituted conspiracy to violate their fundamental
right to travel).
64. See Anderson v. Green, 513 U.S. 557 (1995); Attorney General of New York
v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986); Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S.
612 (1985); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393
(1975); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); see also infra notes 65-100 and accompanying text
(discussing the holding of each case). This Article, however, omits discussion of
durational residency requirement cases involving in-state tuition for higher
education or bona fide residency requirements. For a discussion of these cases, see
Donahue, supra note *.
65. These included areas on which the Court had declined to comment in
Shapiro. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (rejecting the argument that
the state's durational residency requirements were to encourage participation in
the labor force).
66. 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (holding that a Tennessee law requiring individuals to
live in the state for one year and a particular county for three months before being
eligible to vote in state, county and local elections violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
67. See id. at 335 (recognizing that the Court has created more than one
standard of review for Equal Protection cases, depending upon "the interest
affected or the classification involved"). If the right in question is a fundamental
right, then strict scrutiny should be applied; if the right is not a fundamental right,
then rational basis review is the appropriate standard. See id. at 335 n.6 (citing
cases that have made the distinction).
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68
applied strict scrutiny.
The Dunn Court interpreted Shapiro as saying that actual
deterrence of travel was not necessary to implicate the
fundamental right.69 All that was needed, the Court reasoned,
was a showing that the requirements placed an impermissible
penalty on the constitutional right to interstate travel. 70 In other
words, to trigger strict scrutiny, the durational residency
requirements needed only to be capable of deterring travel; there
71
need not be any proof that they actually did deter travel.
The Court next considered an Arizona statute that imposed a
durational residency requirement on free non-emergency medical
care. 72 In Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County,73 the Court once
again applied strict scrutiny74 and struck down Arizona's
durational residency requirement. 75 Determining whether the
durational residency requirement constituted a penalty on the

68. See id. at 335 (concluding that Tennessee must show a compelling state
interest in maintaining its durational residency requirements). The Court also
noted:
[B]ecause a durational residence requirement for voting "operates to
penalize those persons, and only those persons, who have exercised their
constitutional right of interstate migration. .. , [it] may withstand
constitutional scrutiny only upon a clear showing that the burden imposed
is necessary to protect a compelling and substantial governmental
interest."
Id. at 340-41.
69. See id. at 339-40 (specifying that the Shapiro decision did not require that
denial of welfare actually deter travel in order for it to be unconstitutional). The
Dunn court also recognized that earlier cases had similarly lacked such a
requirement. See id. at 340 n.9 (citing Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35 (1868)).
70. See id. at 340 ("In Shapiro we explicitly stated that the compelling-stateinterest test would be triggered by 'any classification which serves to penalize the
exercise of that right [to travel.]"); see also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634
(1969) ("[Iun moving from State to State or to the District of Columbia appellees
were exercising a constitutional right, and any classification which serves to
penalize the exercise of that right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a
compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional."); id. at 650 ("Not only is
this burden of uncertain degree, but appellees themselves assert there is evidence
that few welfare recipients have in fact been deterred [from traveling or migrating
interstate] by residence requirements.").
71. See Dunn, 405 U.S. at 340 ("[Ihe majority [in Shapiro] found no need to
dispute the 'evidence that few welfare recipients have in fact been deterred (from
Indeed, none of the litigants had
moving) by residence requirements'....
themselves been deterred.").
72. See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (striking down
Arizona's durational residency requirement, which required that indigent
individuals live in the state for one year before they could receive nonemergency
medical assistance at county hospitals).
73. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
74. See id. at 254 (requiring that Arizona's durational residency requirement be
justified by a compelling state interest).
75. See id. at 269 (ruling that the state did not meet its burden of justification).
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constitutional right to interstate travel, the Memorial Hospital
Court returned to the reasoning in Shapiro that certain basic
necessities of life cannot be disturbed: 'Whatever the ultimate
parameters of the Shapiropenalty analysis, it is at least clear that
medical care is as much 'a basic necessity of life' to an indigent as
76
welfare assistance."
The first case after Shapiroin which the U.S. Supreme Court
77
upheld a durational residency requirement was Sosna v. Iowa.
Sosna and the cases that followed it involved durational residency
78
requirements that limited services other than welfare benefits.
Sosna is of particular interest for two reasons. First, the majority
pointed out that neither Shapiro nor its progeny ruled that there
could
never
be
a constitutional
durational
residency
requirement. 79 In addition, the majority distinguished Sosna from
earlier cases where the states tried to use budgetary concerns as
0
their justification for the durational residency requirements.8
8
Here, said the Sosna Court, there was no such fiscal concern. 1
Second, the Court was ambiguous as to which standard of review
it used.8 2 Without explicitly committing to either strict scrutiny or
rational basis review, the Court ruled that Iowa's divorce
residency requirement was based on "reasonable" state interests
8 3
and was, therefore, constitutional.
The next durational residency case the Court decided was
Zobel v. Williams.8 4
Here, the Court explicitly avoided a
determination of which standard of review to apply.8 5 The Court
76. Id. at 259.
77. 419 U.S. 393 (1975) (upholding a state statute that required a year's
residency before being able to obtain a divorce in state courts).
78. See id.
79. See id. at 406 ("[NMone of those cases intimated that the States might never
impose durational residency requirements, and such a proposition was in fact
expressly disclaimed.") (citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969);

Memorial Hasp., 415 U.S. at 258).
80. See Sosna, 419 U.S. at 406 (distinguishing Shapiro, 394 U.S. 618; Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Memorial Hosp., 415 U.S. 250).
81. See id. at 406 (recognizing that Iowa's durational residency requirement
was not justified by budgetary concerns).

82. See id. at 410 (holding the Iowa statute "consistent with the provisions of
the United States Constitution" without specifying a standard of review).
83. See id. at 406-07 (explaining that Iowa had a reasonable interest in
imposing a durational residency requirement for the obtainment of divorce decrees
because it neither wanted to impose on other states' interests in a particular
divorce, nor expose divorces issued by its own state to challenges by other states).
84. 457 U.S. 55 (1982) (striking down an Alaska dividend distribution plan
which disbursed proceeds from state oil rights to residents based on how long they
had lived in the state without imposing a minimum length of residency).
85. See id. at 60-61 (discussing the two alternative standards of review for
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simply stated that if the Alaska statute did not meet the minimal
rationality test, it need not decide whether the statute must
survive strict scrutiny.8 6 Indeed, the Court found that the statute
did not even satisfy the minimal rationality test,87 and so Alaska's

dividend distribution plan was struck down without determining
the proper standard of review.88
Three years later, the Court mirrored Zobel's ruling in
Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor.8 9 The Court avoided
applying strict scrutiny as it had in Zobel 90 and evaded choosing
between the standards of review, finding that New Mexico's
durational residency requirement did not meet even the minimal
rationality test. 91

The Court was more explicit about its methods in Attorney
General of New York v. Soto-Lopez.9 2 The Court noted that it
would apply strict scrutiny, regardless of whether the implicated
statute satisfied minimal rationality.9 3 The Court synthesized a
number of previous rulings to formulate a three-part test for
determining when a state law implicates the right to travel.9 4 The
new test stated that a state law implicates the right to travel
"when it actually deters such travel.., when impeding travel is
its primary objective ...or when it uses 'any classification which
serves to penalize the existence of that right.' 9 5

Equal Protection analysis, but declining to choose one).
86. See id. ("[f the statutory scheme cannot pass even the minimal test ...we
need not decide whether any enhanced scrutiny is called for.").
87. See id. at 63-64 (holding that Alaska's purported justification for the
dividend distribution plan, to reward residents' past contributions to the state, had
been rejected in Shapiro and remained an impermissible justification).
88. See id. at 65 (holding that the Alaska statute violated the Equal Protection
Clause).
89. 472 U.S. 612 (1985) (striking down a New Mexico statute which did not
impose a threshold residency requirement, but rather provided a tax break to
veterans of the Vietnam War who had resided in New Mexico prior to May 8, 1976).
90. See id. at 618 (declining to decide on a standard of review).
91. See id. at 621-22 (holding that the New Mexico statute's distinction between
resident veterans was not rationally related to the asserted legislative goal).
92. 476 U.S. 898 (1986) (holding as unconstitutional a New York statute which
gave special civil service preference to veterans who had become members of the
military while residing in the state).
93. See id. at 905 n.4 ('Of course, regardless of the label we place on our
analysis-right to migrate or equal protection-once we find a burden on the right
to migrate the standard of review is the same. Laws which burden that right must

be necessary to further a compelling state interest.").
94. See id. at 903 (citing Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, 46 (1868); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 628-31 (1969); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 62 (1982);
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 340 (1972)).
95. Id. at 903.
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The next durational residency requirement case decided by
the Supreme Court addressed welfare benefits once again. 96
Anderson v. Green97 involved a California durational residency
requirement limiting AFDC benefits for the first year of a
newcomer's residency to the amount they would have received in
their prior state of residence. 98 The case, however, was not
decided on its merits.99 Rather, the Court determined that the
case was not ripe and dismissed it on that basis. 100 Major
legislative changes in public assistance would occur before the
Court would return to the issue of durational residency
requirements for welfare benefits.
C. CongressRebels Against Shapiro
Federal statutes governing welfare changed drastically in
1996 when Congress passed the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA).101
PRWORA did
something that previous AFDC legislation did not-it gave
permission to the individual states to impose durational residency
requirements for the receipt of welfare benefits. 102 The language
of PRWORA is explicit:
A State operating a program funded under this part may
apply to a family the rules (including benefit amounts) of the
program funded under this part of another State if the family
has moved to the State from the other
State and has resided in
03
the State for less than 12 months.
As one commentator recognized, "[i]nterestingly, there is no
mention of Shapiro,or its progeny, in the legislative history of the
Act."'104 The Supreme Court in Shapiro stated that Congress could
96. See Anderson v. Green, 513 U.S. 557 (1995) (involving a California
durational residency requirement which limited AFDC benefits).
97. 513 U.S. 557 (1995).
98. See id. at 557.
99. See id. at 560 (deciding the case without ruling on the constitutionality of
the durational residency requirement).
100. See id. at 559. The Court explained as follows:
After the Court of Appeals ruled in this case, it vacated the HHS
[Secretary of Health and Human Services] waiver in a separate
proceeding, concluding that the Secretary had not adequately considered
objections to California's program. The Secretary did not seek this Court's
review of the Beno decision. California acknowledges that even if it
prevails here, the payment differential will not take effect.

Id.
101. 42 U.S.C. § 607 (Supp IV 1998).
102. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text (discussing Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)).
103. 42 U.S.C. § 604(c) (Supp.III 1997).
104. Donahue, supra note *,at 474.
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not, in essence, give the states permission to violate the
Constitution. 105 As states rely on PRWORA in designing their
welfare reform statutes, state courts are beginning to encounter
the issue. 106 Nevertheless, with PRWORA in hand, states began
107
re-designing their welfare policies.
D. Rebellion Among the States
Close on the heels of Congress' PRWORA came the states'
individual versions of welfare reform, many of which incorporated
some sort of durational residency requirement. 08 Many variations
were included among the new state welfare legislation.
Durational residency requirements, modeled on PRWORA, limited
new residents' welfare benefits for the first year to the amount of
benefits they would have received in their previous states (if that
amount was less than the amount they would receive in their new
state).10 9 Some states had requirements that denied certain
benefits completely for the first year of residency. 110 There were
also requirements that limited new residents' benefits for the first
six months to a grant no greater than eighty percent of the
benefits awarded longer-term residents,"' as well as requirements
105. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text (discussing Shapiro, 394 U.S.
at 618).
106. See infra notes 114-141 and accompanying text (discussing allegiance
among the courts).
107. See infra notes 108-113 and accompanying text.
108. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 256J.12(3) (1997); MINN. STAT. § 256J.43 (1997); see
also Maldonado v. Houstoun, 177 F.R.D. 311, 316-17 (E.D. Penn. 1997), affd, 157
F.3d 179 (3d Cir. 1998):
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996 specifically authorizes states to treat interstate immigrants for one
year under the welfare rules (including benefit amounts) of the states from
which they moved. Thus, plaintiffs, here, do not seek to enjoin a statute
which is an anomaly in the current reformation process but rather
plaintiffs seek to enjoin and have declared unconstitutional a statute
which many states and the national government believe is central to their
current reform efforts.
Id. (citation omitted).
109. See Davis v. Doth, No. 62-C6-97-010231 (Minn. Dist. Ct., 2nd Dist. July 31,
1998) (enjoining enforcement of Minnesota durational residency requirement); Roe
v. Anderson, 966 F. Supp. 977 (E.D. Calif. 1997), affd, 134 F.3d 1400 (1998)
(holding that California's durational residency requirement was an impermissible
penalty on the right to interstate travel and violated Equal Protection); see also
Maldonado v. Houstoun, 177 F.R.D. 311 (E.D. Penn. 1997), affid, 157 F.3d 179 (3d
Cir. 1998) (issuing a preliminary injunction against enforcement of Pennsylvania
durational residency requirement).
110. See County of Niagara v. Shaffer, 607 N.Y.S.2d 466 (Sup. Ct. 1994) (holding
county durational residency requirement inconsistent with state social services
law).
111. See Aumick v. Bane, 612 N.Y.S.2d 766 ( Sup. Ct. 1994) (striking down state
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that reduced new residents' benefits by thirty percent for the first
year." 2 Finally, some durational residency requirements denied
new residents benefits for the first sixty days they resided in their
new state. 113
E. Allegiance Among the Courts
The constitutionality of several states' durational residency
requirements was soon attacked at the state court level." 4 Prior
to welfare reform, only one state court upheld a durational
residency requirement for welfare benefits." 5 The courts that
ruled on the issue post-PRWORA unanimously agreed that the
newest wave of durational residency requirements was
unconstitutional, notwithstanding PRWORA. 116
The most recent durational residency requirement state court
case, Davis v. Doth, was decided in Minnesota in July 1998.117

statute that limited public assistance for new residents to the greater of either 80%
of the full benefits package for similarly situated longer-term residents, or the
standard benefits payment the applicant would have received in her previous state
of residence).
112. See Westenfelder v. Ferguson, 998 F. Supp. 146 (D.R.I. 1998) (holding
Rhode Island requirement unconstitutional).
113. See Warrick v. Snider, 2 F. Supp. 2d 720 (W.D. Penn. 1997) (finding that
the Pennsylvania durational residency requirement did not meet the rational basis
test). Note that the durational residency requirement struck down in Pennsylvania
was almost identical to the one upheld in Wisconsin in 1992. See Jones v.
Milwaukee County, 485 N.W.2d 21 (1992).
114. See infra notes 115-141 and accompanying text (discussing allegiance
among the courts).
115. See Jones, 485 N.W.2d at 21 (upholding a 60-day waiting period for indigent
newcomers to receive full welfare benefits).
116. See infra notes 117-127 and accompanying text (discussing Davis v. Doth).
117. See Davis v. Doth, No. 62-C6-97-010231 (Minn. Dist. Ct., 2nd Dist. July 31,
1998) (enjoining enforcement of durational residency requirement limiting new
residents' welfare benefits for the first year to the amount of benefits they would
have received in their previous states). It is interesting to note that Minnesota has
two separate durational residency requirements; only one was litigated in the 1998
suit. See id. The remaining requirement is a "simple residency" requirement. See
id. This requirement still stands:
To be eligible for AFDC or MFIP-S, whichever is in effect, a family must
have established residency in this state which means the family is present
in the state and intends to remain here.... A family is considered to have
established residency in this state only when a child or caregiver has
resided in this state for at least 30 days with the intention of making the
person's home here and not for any temporary purpose.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256J.12 (1997). The constitutionality of this provision was not
litigated because the parties bringing the suit felt it was not unreasonable to allow
the state (county, etc.) 30 days in which to process paperwork after the applicant
had moved into the state. See Anne Quincy, Legal Aid Society of Minneapolis,
Remarks at Meeting of Poverty Law Seminar, University of Minnesota Law School
(Nov. 16, 1998).
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This case is unique for two reasons. First, Minnesota is the only
state court that has specifically denounced Congress' attempt to
ns
override the Supreme Court's previous rulings with PRWORA.
Second, the Davis court based its decision not only on Shapiro and
its progeny, but also on a Minnesota Supreme Court case, Mitchell
v. Steffen." 9
Davis also affords an opportunity to take an anecdotal look at
the effect durational residency requirements have on welfare
recipients' lives. Consider the plight of Mary, one of the named
plaintiffs in the Minnesota case. 120 Mary left Mississippi in the
2
early 1990s, fleeing domestic abuse, and resettled in Minnesota.' '
She had lived in Minnesota for about five years when her abusive
ex-husband finally learned of her whereabouts. 122 To keep her
children from her ex-husband, Mary took them to her mother's
home in Mississippi for the summer. 123 Meanwhile, Mary
124
returned to Minnesota and essentially hid for three months.
During this time, she informed her social worker that her children
were not with her for the summer, and to stop sending her
assistance checks because of their absence. 125 At the end of the
summer, Mary returned to her mother's home, picked up her
children, and brought them back to Minnesota. 126 When she went
to her welfare case worker to reinstate her and her children's
benefits, she was told that the three months her children spent in
Mississippi terminated her family's Minnesota residency, and that
she would receive Mississippi benefits (approximately $300 less
127
than Minnesota's benefits) for the next twelve months.
Pennsylvania's recent cases also stand out in the mix of
118. See Davis, No. 62-C6-97-010231, slip op. at 11 ("Congress' blessing does not
shield the durational residency requirements from [strict scrutiny].").
119. 504 N.W.2d 198 (Minn. 1993) (holding unconstitutional a pre-PRWORA
durational residency requirement which limited new residents' welfare benefits for
the first six months they lived in Minnesota to sixty percent of the amount of
benefits they would otherwise receive). For a critique of the approach taken in
Mitchell, see Deborah K McKnight, Minnesota Rational Relation Test: The Lochner
Monster in the 10,000 Lakes, 10 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 709 (1984) (arguing that
the standard of review used in Mitchell is flawed). McKnight also criticizes the
approach taken in State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1991) (using "enhanced"
rational basis review in dealing with state equal protection clause).
120. See Quincy, supra note 117.
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See id.
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durational residency requirement litigation. 12s In 1997, both the
Eastern District and Western District Courts of Pennsylvania
considered cases involving durational residency requirements. 1 29
In both cases, the courts explicitly chose to apply a rational basis
test rather than the strict scrutiny applied by the Shapiro line of
cases. 30 The Eastern District court in Maldonado v. Houstounl3l
noted a trend away from strict scrutiny in the more recent
Supreme Court durational residency requirement cases. 132 The
Maldonado court acknowledged that whatever its perception of
recent Supreme Court holdings, it would have to apply the
standard set forth in Shapiro if it determined that the durational
residency requirement at issue constituted a penalty on the
constitutional right to interstate travel. 33 However, the court
found that a durational residency requirement that limits an
indigent newcomer's cash benefits to the amount she would have
received in her state of prior residence did not constitute a penalty
on the right to travel, and hence did not trigger strict scrutiny. 134
Rather, the court applied a rational basis test to the two purposes
Pennsylvania offered for its durational residency requirement: (1)
to avoid becoming a "welfare magnet" for indigent persons; and (2)
"to encourage employment, self-respect, and self-dependency
among its welfare recipients."'135
Pennsylvania's durational
residency requirement was not rationally related to either of these
goals, ruled the court, and therefore violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 136 Later in 1997, the
128. See Maldonado, 177 F.R.D. 311 (issuing preliminary injunction against
enforcement of Pennsylvania's durational residency requirement); Warrick v.
Snider, 2 F. Supp. 2d 720 (W.D. Penn. 1997) (finding that Pennsylvania's
durational residency requirement did not meet even rational basis test).
129. See id.
130. See Maldonado, 177 F.R.D. at 331 (finding that durational residency
requirement at issue did not constitute enough of a penalty on the right to travel to
trigger strict scrutiny); Warrick, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 725 (finding that strict scrutiny
was not applicable in the case at hand).
131. 177 F.R.D. 311.
132. See id. at 326 (noting that no Supreme Court majority has used strict
scrutiny in a durational residency requirement case since Memorial Hospital v.
Maricopa County).
133. See id. at 328 (acknowledging that Shapiro's reasoning remained binding
precedent for the lower courts).
134. See id. at 331 (reasoning that because indigent newcomers were. denied only
cash benefits, and still had access to food stamps, clothing banks, medical
assistance, emergency assistance, and certain transportation assistance, that the
durational residency requirement did not amount to a penalty on the right to
travel).
135. Id. at 332.
136. See id. at 333 (holding that Pennsylvania's durational residency
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225

United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania adopted the Maldonado reasoning almost verbatim
when it struck down a less stringent durational residency
requirement which denied new residents benefits for the first sixty
days they resided in the state. 137 The Third Circuit affirmed
Maldonado's holding, but it rejected the district court's
reasoning. 138 The Third Circuit, like the Shapiro Court, held that
strict scrutiny rather than rational basis review should have been
used.139 The circuit court further criticized the district court's
attempt to identify and act upon a trend in recent Supreme Court
cases. 14° However, the district court's use of rational basis review
may still be instructive, especially in light of the circuit court's
expressed reservations about the prudence of the Supreme Court's
dependence on the constitutional right to travel. 141

requirement failed the rational relation test).
137. See Warrick, 2 F. Supp. 2d 720 (finding that Pennsylvania's durational
residency requirement did not meet even a rational basis test). Pennsylvania is not
the only state to strike down durational residency requirements using a rational
basis test rather than strict scrutiny, although it is the only state to do so explicitly.
In 1998, the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island found
that the reasons offered by the state for its durational residency requirement did
not satisfy even a rational basis test, and so did not reach the question of whether
strict scrutiny would be satisfied. See Westenfelder v. Fergusen, 998 F. Supp. 146
(D.R.I. 1998) (holding that the Rhode Island's durational residency requirement did
constitute an impermissible penalty on the right to travel and was therefore subject
to strict scrutiny, but that the requirement did not satisfy even a rational basis
test).
138. See Maldonado v. Houstoun, 157 F.3d 179, 187 (3d Cir. 1998) ("[W]e are
persuaded that the district court's 'penalty' analysis... misconstrued the import of
the relevant case law and used an improper comparison.").
139. See id. at 190 (following the precedent of Shapiroand Menmrial Hospital).
140. See id. at 186. The Court stated:
This tendency... [of the Supreme Court to oscillate between rational basis
and strict scrutiny] does not establish that rational basis is now the
appropriate test when evaluating durational residency requirements as
applied to welfare benefits. The Court in those cases merely employed its
version of rational basis analysis because the challenged laws could not
even survive rational basis review. Thus, the Court found it unnecessary
to subject the laws to heightened scrutiny.
Id.
141. See id. at 185 ("Regrettably... the law with respect to the constitutional
implications of the right to travel is unsettled and in need of clarification. The
Court has at times subjected durational residence laws that impinge on the right to
travel to strict scrutiny.., and at other times to what appears to be some form of a
heightened rational basis test."); id. at 190 ("Because Shapiro and Maricopa County
have never been overruled by the Court, we follow the Court's directive and conclude
that they dictate the result of this case.") (emphasis added).
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F. The Court Affirms Shapiro
In 1997, the California case Roe v. Anderson142 entered the
durational residency requirement debate. California's breed of
durational residency requirement for welfare benefits was common
among the states: families who have lived in California for less
than twelve months were to receive welfare benefits no greater
than those they would have received in their state of prior
residence. 143 The California system had previously been
challenged, and the issue reached the Supreme Court in Anderson
v. Green,144 but the constitutionality of durational residency
45
requirements was not resolved.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari for Roe in September
1998,146 and the case became Saenz v. Roe. 147 Saenz did not afford
the Court the same escape from the ultimate issue as Anderson
did, 148 primarily because it arose post-PRWORA and was therefore
not subject to a waiver from the Secretary of Health and Human
Services. 149 The case gave the Supreme Court an opportunity to
reinforce, redefine, or reject its reasoning in its line of durational
residency requirement cases. The Court chose to hold California's
durational residency requirement statute unconstitutional, and
150
reinforce the constitutional right to travel as the justification.

142. 966 F. Supp. 977 (E.D. Cal. 1997), cert. grantedsub nona. Anderson v. Roe,
119 S.Ct. 31 (1998) (holding that California's durational residency requirement was
an impermissible penalty on the right to interstate travel and violated Equal

Protection).
143. See supra notes 108-113 and accompanying text (describing state durational
residency requirements modeled after PRWORA).
144. See Anderson v. Green, 513 U.S. 557 (1995) (dismissing case for not being
ripe).
145. See id. at 559 (finding that the parties had no live dispute). See also supra
notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
146. See Anderson v. Roe, No. 98-97, 1998 WL 407156 (U.S.).
147. 119 S.Ct. 1518 (1999). See also Justices To Tackle Census, Welfare Cases,
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Oct. 4, 1998, at All. For Supreme Court briefs see Brief
for Petitioner, Anderson v. Roe, 1998 WL 784602; Brief for Respondent, Anderson
v. Roe, 1998 WL 847469.
148. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
149. See Saenz v. Roe, 119 S.Ct. 1518, 1522 (1999). See also Roe v. Anderson, 966
F. Supp. 977, 979 (E.D. Cal. 1997) ("The PRWORA significantly increased the
states' discretion to design their federally supported welfare plans without seeking
waivers from the Secretary." (emphasis added)).
150. See Saenz, 119 S.Ct. at 1524, 1528.
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II. Approaches to Deciding Durational Residency
Requirements Litigation
A. The TraditionalApproach: The ConstitutionalRight to
Travel and Its Inherent Weaknesses
"Americans show extraordinary ambivalence about mobility.
It is at once treasured and feared: treasured as an attribute and
enabler of personal autonomy, feared as a characteristic of the
unpredictable and uncontrollable stranger."1 5' Like the American
public, the Supreme Court is conflicted about mobility, albeit in a
different manner. 152
The Shapiro holding relies on the
constitutional right to travel, or, perhaps more correctly, the
constitutional right to interstate migration. 5 3 The right to travel
has long been recognized, 154 but never well-defined, 155 by the
Supreme Court. The Shapiro Court went so far as to explicitly
state, "We have no occasion to ascribe the source of this right to
travel interstate to a particular constitutional provision."156 The
right, the Court said, was implicit:
[The] right finds no explicit mention in the Constitution. The
reason, it has been suggested, is that a right so elementary
was conceived from the beginning to be a necessary
concomitant of the stronger Union the Constitution created.
In any event, freedom to travel throughout the United States
has long been
recognized as a basic right under the
57
Constitution. 1

151. Susan Bennett, The Threat of the Wandering Poor: Welfare Parochialism
and Its Impact on the Use of Housing Mobility as an Anti-Poverty Strategy, 22
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1207, 1209 (1995) (paraphrasing Lawrence M. Friedman,
Crimes of Mobility, 43 STAN. L. REV. 637, 638 (1991)).
152. See infra notes 154-179 and accompanying text (describing the evolution
and scope of a constitutionally-based right to travel).
153. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text (explaining the Court's
rationale for finding a basic right to travel).
154. The Supreme Court first recognized a constitutional right to travel in
Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35, 49 (1867) (holding that imposition of a tax for
passing through a state violated a constitutional right to travel). See id. ("We are
all citizens of the United States, and as members of the same community must
have the right to pass and repass through every part of it without interruption, as
freely as in our own States.").
155. See Matthew Poppe, Defining the Scope of the Equal ProtectionClause with
Respect to Welfare Waiting Periods, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 291, 303 (1994) ('iT]he
Supreme Court... has never achieved unanimity in deciding a right to travel case,
nor has it applied the same approach in every case involving a durational residency
requirement or similar law.").
156. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969).
157. Id. at 630-31 (quoting Justice Stewart's opinion in United States v. Guest,
383 U.S. 745, 757-58 (1966)).
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This has been referred to as Justice Brennan's "structural
approach," essentially that the very nature of the Constitution
gives rise to a right to travel. 5 8 Many commentators have
criticized the structural approach, asserting that implicit reference
to a right to travel in the Constitution is not substantial enough to
support such a broad right. 159
Several other possible sources for a constitutional right to
travel have been suggested and criticized over the years. Justice
O'Connor has advocated for the Comity Clause (also known as
Article Four's Privileges and Immunities Clause) as the foundation
for the right.160 This theory, advanced in her Zobel v. Williams
concurrence,16 1 has also been attacked:
The main criticism of finding the source of the right to travel
in the Comity Clause is that the Clause applies only to the
right to travel, but not the right to interstate migration. Thus,
the Clause protects a citizen of State A from being denied
for Citizen A when it is
rights by State B, but does nothing
162
State A that denies him rights.
A third possible source for the right to travel is the Privileges
163
and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Commentators have also denounced this source, primarily because
"the Slaughter-House Cases basically eviscerated this clause by
holding that it only protected citizens from state interference with

158. See Donahue, supra note *,at 468 (describing Justice Brennan's approach
to the constitutional right to travel). Donahue goes on to point out that Brennan
advanced his structural approach not only in Shapiro, but in Zobel v. Williams as
well, stating, "the frequent attempts to assign the right to travel some textual
source in the Constitution seem to me to have proved both inconclusive and
unnecessary." Id. at 469 (quoting Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 66 (1982)
(Brennan, J., concurring)).
159. See, e.g., Gregory B. Hartch, Wrong Turn& A Critique of the Supreme
Court's Right to Travel Cases, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 457, 476 (1995) (CWhile
there is undoubtedly merit to the notion that some form of right to travel is implicit
within the concept of a federal union, it is important to realize that this rationale
falls far short of justifying the extremely broad right necessary to invalidate the
statutes in Soto-Lopez and Zobel.").
160. See Zobel, 457 U.S. at 71 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also U.S. CONST.
art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and
Immunities of Citizens in the several States.").
161. See Zobel, 457 U.S. at 73-74 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("I would measure
Alaska's scheme against the principles implementing the Privileges and
Immunities Clause.").
162. Donahue, supra note *,at 469. Donahue is careful to include that "Justice
O'Connor rejected this criticism, however, implying that it was merely a technical
distinction." Id.
163. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2 ("[N]o State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United

States[.]").
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the privileges or immunities of national citizenship." 164 Welfare
benefits are neither a privilege nor an immunity of national
citizenship;165 if they were, the Shapiro Court would not have had
166
to base its decision on a fundamental right to travel.
The Saenz Court addresses all three of these possible sources
for a constitutional right to travel. 167 In its opinion, the Court
refers to the possible sources as "components" of the right to
travel:
The 'right to travel'. . . embraces at least three different
components. It protects the right of a citizen of one State to
enter and to leave another State, the right to be treated as a
welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when
temporarily present in the second State, and, for those
travelers who elect to become permanent residents, the right
to be treated like other citizens of that State. 16
The first component, the Court reasons, does not apply to the
case of durational residency requirements, and so there is no need
to identify its constitutional source. 169 The Court is more willing
to attach the second component to the Comity Clause, even though
it finds that this component, too, has no bearing on the case at
hand. 170
Finally, the Court settles on the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the purported
birthplace of the third component of the right to travel, with which
to strike down California's durational residency requirement for
72
welfare benefits.' 7' Despite significant criticism to the contrary,
the Saenz Court claims that couching a constitutional right to
travel in the Fourteenth Amendment has always been "common
ground." 73 For the Court to use such bold language regarding a
right as contentious as the right to travel suggests that either it is

164. Donahue, supra note *,at 470.
165. See, e.g., Maldonado v. Houstoun, 177 F.R.D. 311, 323 (E.D. Pa. 1997)
("[T]here is no constitutional right to public welfare assistance ....
").
166. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) ('[A]ny classification
which serves to penalize the exercise of [a constitutional] right, unless shown to be
necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional.").
167. See Saenz v. Roe, 119 S.Ct. 1518, 1525 (1999).
168. Id.
169. See id.
170. See id. at 1526.
171. See id.
172. See supranotes 161-164 and accompanying text.
173. Saenz, 119 S.Ct. at 1526 ("Despite fundamentally differing views
concerning the coverage of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, most notably expressed in the majority and dissenting opinions in the
Slaughter-House Cases... it has always been common ground that this Clause
protects the third component of the right to travel.").
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not aware of the difficulties surrounding the right, or, more
plausibly, it is well aware of the difficulties and wishes to
downplay them.
There is at least one other theory on the origins of a
constitutional right to travel, though it is less often discussed.
This theory focuses on the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 174 Interestingly, Justice Brennan, the same Justice
who criticized attempts to ground the right to travel in any specific
constitutional clause, 175 has also been the main shepherd of the
Citizenship Clause theory. 176 Aside from Justice Brennan,
however, this theory has not been thoroughly discussed. 177
Finally, while no Supreme Court Justice has sponsored such
a position, there has been scholarly support for a moral
justification for the right to travel. 17s But this justification has
been largely discarded, even by the very scholar who suggested
it. 179

B. Alternative Approaches: SubsidizationAnalogies
A unique approach proffered by Michael Hartmann is
instructive in considering other dangers in using the constitutional
174. U.S. CONST.amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1 ("All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside.").
175. See supra notes 156-158 and accompanying text (describing Justice
Brennan's structural approach to finding a constitutional basis supporting the
fundamental right to travel).
176. See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 69 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring)
("[The Citizenship Clause] does not provide for, and does not allow for, degrees of
citizenship based on length of residence."). But see Donahue, supra note *,at 471
("Other scholars have interpreted this clause to mean that 'it is unconstitutional to
deny benefits to new citizens that are extended to other citizens similarly
situated-subject only to reasonable assurances that claims of new residence are
bona fide."') (quoting William Cohen, DiscriminationAgainst New State Citizens.
An Update, 11 CONST. COMMENTARY 73, 79 (1994)).
177. But see William Cohen, Discrimination Against New State Citizens: An
Update, 11 CONST.

COMMENT.

73, 74 (1994)

(arguing that the

confusion

surrounding durational residency requirement cases should be resolved by deciding
the cases using the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); see also id.
at 78 ("These [durational residency requirement cases] should be easy cases. They
are not because they have been viewed through the Byzantine lens of equal
protection doctrine, and not as a straightforward application of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Citizenship Clause.").
178. See Hartch, supra note 159, at 477 ("If a broad right to travel is going to be
adopted, the justification must rest on either moral or prudential grounds.").
179. See id. at 477-78 ("Even on these terms [moral or prudential grounds],
however, the argument falls short... individuals may have a natural right to move
from one place to another unimpeded. However, this right does not translate into
an entitlement to welfare or housing every time one decides to move from state to
state.").
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right to travel as the basis for striking down durational residency
requirements. 180 Hartmann suggests that the Shapiro line of
cases could be read as being in line with "cases [in which] the
Court has upheld public-assistance programs that merely refused
to subsidize the exercise of constitutionally protected, fundamental
rights," and that if the burden of durational residency
requirements is not so great as to actually prevent a person from
relocating, then durational residency requirements should be
8
Hartmann states:
deemed constitutional.I1
[S]ome [durational residency] 'requirements... may not be
penalties upon the exercise of the constitutional right of
interstate travel.' Although Justice Brennan did not intimate
[that a welfare durational residency requirement] might be
such a requirement, if... the cost of such a condition does not
exceed the cost of... the right to 'migrate, resettle, find a new
job, and start a new life' and the requirement's effect is thus to
merely refuse to subsidize and not to penalize the exercise of
that right, then such a residency-requirement condition is
constitutional. 182
Hartmann likens durational residency requirements cases to
two other situations-abortion 8 3 and procreation, 8 4 in which he
argues the Court "merely refused to subsidize" the exercise of
fundamental rights through benefit programs. 8 5 He maintains
that, like limitations on assistance program funds for abortion, or
to support families with numerous children, durational residency
requirements on welfare benefits simply refuse to provide public
funding for interstate migration, rather than constitute a penalty
86
against the right. 1
180. See Michael E. Hartmann, Tiers for Fears,Fears of Tiers, 40 WAYNE L. REV.
1401 (1994).
181. Id. at 1445.
182. Id. at 1475-76.
183. See id. at 1445-52.
184. See id. at 1453-63.
185. Id. at 1445 (asserting that the Supreme Court's reasoning in its line of
durational residency requirement cases is consistent with cases in which "the Court
has upheld public-assistance programs that merely refused to subsidize the
exercise of constitutionally protected, fundamental rights"). Specifically, he cites
Lyng v. Castillo,477 U.S. 635 (1986) (concluding that the Federal Food Stamp Act's
limitations on benefit increases for growing households did not constitute a
penalty); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding the Hyde Amendment,
which prohibited states from allowing Medicaid funds to be used for any abortion);
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (holding that Connecticut's refusal to use
Medicaid funds to pay for abortions that were not medically necessary did not
constitute a penalty upon a constitutional right); and Dandridge v. Willians, 397
U.S. 471 (1970) (upholding Maryland's cap on welfare benefits a family could
receive, regardless of number of children, because it did not constitute a penalty).
186. See Hartmann, supra note 180, at 1464-74 (utilizing a complicated
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The cases to which Hartmann analogizes are distinguishable
in several respects from the durational residency requirement
87
cases facing the states and the Supreme Court today.
Nevertheless, his analysis points to some of the less-recognized
precedential dangers of using the traditional constitutional right
to travel in deciding durational residency requirement cases. 188
C. Alternative Approaches: Indigent Newcomers as a
Suspect Class
Some theorists have attempted to avoid the difficulties
inherent in applying the constitutional right to travel, and simply
label indigent newcomers as a suspect class. 189
Legislation
affecting indigent newcomers would then be subject to strict
scrutiny regardless of whether it touched on fundamental
rights.190 The requirements for being classified as a suspect class
are that the class be a discrete and insular minority, 91 lack real
differences from other groups, have experienced historical
discrimination,
be
politically
disenfranchised,
display
characteristics which are immutable, and be susceptible to the risk
of stigma. 92 These requirements are difficult to apply to the class
of indigent newcomers; indigency, unlike other characteristics, is
193
not easily identifiable.
At least one commentator, Matthew Poppe, has offered a

mathematical formula to determine the cost and subsidization of the interstate
migration of indigents).
187. For example, the economic factor and the fundamental right in question in
the cases noted above, see supra note 185, are more interconnected than are the
denial of welfare benefits based on length of residency and the right to travel. As
Hartmann himself points out, "Shapiro and Maricopa County did not hold that
States would penalize the right to travel interstate by refusing to pay the bus fares
of the indigent travelers." Hartmann, supra note 180, at 1446.
188. Namely, the viewpoint that what constitutes an impermissible penalty on
the right to travel can always be determined through strict economics. See
Hartmann, supra note 180, at 1464-74 (applying a mathematical formula to
determine what constitutes a penalty on the right to travel).
189. See Thomas R. McCoy, Recent Equal Protection Decisions-undamental
Right to Travel or "Newcomers"Asa Suspect Class?, 28 VAND. L. REV. 987, 1016-17
(1975).
190. See id.
191. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938)
("[Pirejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition,
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily
to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly
more searching judicial inquiry.").
192. See Poppe, supra note 155, at 308-15.
193. See, e.g., Donahue, supra note *,at 471 ('Although [newcomers] are
typically a minority, they are by no means 'discrete and insular.-).
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unique solution to these difficulties by suggesting that indigent
newcomers be recognized as a quasi-suspect class. 194 Poppe first
discards the possible justifications for a constitutional right to
travel. 195 He then argues that indigent newcomers should be
considered a quasi-suspect class, so that durational residency
requirements would be subject to intermediate scrutiny, "a form of
heightened scrutiny that takes into account the special
characteristics of poor newcomers while recognizing that they do
not warrant the strict scrutiny protection afforded to traditionally
suspect classes." 196 Poppe defines a quasi-suspect class as "a class
that shares many, if not all, of the relevant characteristics that
give racial and national groups their suspect nature." 197 Indigent
newcomers, argues Poppe, meet each of the requirements for a
suspect class at least well enough to be classified as a quasi98
suspect class.1
III. Analysis
A. Reliance on a ConstitutionalRight to Travel Is Flawed
One of the greatest weaknesses of Shapiro, Saenz and the
other durational residency requirement cases is their reliance on
the constitutional right to travel. Justice Brennan's structuralist
approach is conclusory at best' 99 because he relies on no passage in
the Constitution that either explicitly or implicitly recognizes a
right to travel. 200 Rather, he simply states that since such a right
has always been recognized, the Court should continue to

194. See generally Poppe, supra note 155.
195. See id. at 303-07 (tracing the controversial history of the constitutional
right to travel).
196. Id. at 308.
197. Id.
198. See id. at 314-15 (stating that the class of indigent newcomers has more in
common with groups that have been granted quasi-suspect status than with those
groups which have been denied the status). For examples of cases in which the
Supreme Court has granted quasi-suspect status to a class, see Mills v. Habluetzel,
456 U.S. 91, 97-102 (1982) (applying intermediate scrutiny and holding that Texas'
method of determining paternity deprived illegitimate children of Equal Protection)
and Mississippi Univ. for Wonen v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724-25, 733 (1982)
(applying a form of intermediate scrutiny and holding that denying males
enrollment in School of Nursing violates Equal Protection). For an example of a
case in which the Supreme Court has denied a class quasi-suspect status, see
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 432-33 (1985) (declining to
classify the mentally retarded as a quasi-suspect class).
199. See supra notes 156-159 and accompanying text (discussing the structural
approach utilized in Shapiro).

200. See id.
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Justice O'Connor's justification for the right to travel, based
on the Comity Clause, is similarly flawed. 202 As mentioned in Part
II, the Comity Clause is also known as Article Four's Privileges
and Immunities Clause. 203 The difficulty with finding a right to
travel in this clause is that the clause was designed to protect
citizens from one state traveling through another state. 204 It was
not designed to protect a citizen who has settled in a new state
from actions taken against her by that state. 205 Therefore, any
right to travel that is predicated on the Comity Clause will be a
right limited to travel only. The Court itself has not applied the
206
"right to travel" in such a restricted manner.
Finding a right to travel in either the Privileges and
Immunities Clause 207 or the Citizenship Clause 20 8 also strains the
language of those passages. The dilemmas in placing a right to
travel in the Privileges and Immunities Clause are the same as
those for the Comity Clause. The Citizenship Clause merely
extends United States citizenship to citizenship of the state in
which a person resides.20 9 It does not specify what rights a person
has when she moves from one state to another.21 0 Chief Justice
Rehnquist points out as much in his dissenting opinion in
Saenz. 2 11 Indeed, Rehnquist considers deriving a right to travel
from the Fourteenth Amendment to be even more absurd than
deriving such a right from the Comity Clause. 212 The Chief Justice
is unwilling to make the leap of faith necessary to see a right to
travel in the Fourteenth Amendment:
[I] cannot see how the right to become a citizen of another
201. See id.
202. See supra notes 160-162 and accompanying text.
203. See supra note 160 and accompanying text (discussing the Comity Clause).
204. See supra note 162 and accompanying text (discussing the flaws associated
with using the Comity Clause to ratify a right to travel).
205. See id.
206. See, e.g., Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 634 ("[fIn nwving from State to State ...
appellees were exercising a constitutional right." [emphasis added]).
207. See supra notes 163-166 and accompanying text (discussing the Privileges
and Immunities Clause).
208. See supra notes 174-177 and accompanying text (discussing the citizenship
Clause).
209. See supra note 174 (quoting the language of the Citizenship Clause).
210. See id.
211. See Saenz v. Roe, 119 S.Ct. 1518, 1530-35 (1999) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
212. See id. at 1531 CI... have no difficulty with aligning the right to travel
with the protections afforded by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV,
§2 [the Comity Clause] .... ")(Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting).
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State is a necessary 'component' of the right to travel, or why
the Court tries to marry these separate and distinct rights. A
person is no longer 'traveling' in any sense of the word when
his journey to a State which he plans to make his
he finishes
213
home.

Granted, the Chief Justice does not leap to mind as an
example of an advocate for welfare rights. Therefore, his position
may appear tainted by his views on welfare rights in general
rather than based on his commitment to a constitutional right to
travel.
A fundamental right to interstate migration does seem in line
with the basic tenets of this country's creation. However, for
whatever reason, the framers did not explicitly include the right in
the Constitution, and one does not need to be a strict literalist to
have difficulty finding the right to travel stated implicitly
anywhere in the Constitution. Although it did not stop them from
holding that a constitutional right to travel exists, even the
majority in Saenz admits that "[t]he word 'travel' is not found in
214
the text of the Constitution."
Identifying a justification for a constitutional right to travel
may be noble and even necessary. However, when something
crucial to citizens' everyday survival, such as welfare benefits,
hangs on the existence of such a right, the search for a justification
must be suspended in favor of more effective and straightforward
ways to deal with the issue. The Supreme Court must provide
lawmakers with a more credible justification than the
constitutional right to travel if it truly wishes to deter the
enactment of future durational residency requirements for welfare
benefits. 2 15 Even after Shapiro, a constitutional right to travel
and strict scrutiny did not stop Congress from enacting PRWORA
or the states from developing brand new durational residency
requirements. Returning to the same faulty logic in Saenz does
little to halt the vicious cycle of ever-more creative ways to deny
indigent persons welfare benefits.
B. Will the Court Createa New Quasi-Suspect Class?
Poppe's suggested alternative to using the constitutional
right to travel as a basis for deciding durational residency

213. Id.
214. Id.at 1524.
215. But see Donahue, supranote *,at 484 (arguing that the most prudent thing
for the Court to do once the issue of durational residency requirements comes
before it again is simply to apply and reinforce the reasoning of Shapiro).
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requirements does not help matters. 2 16 Even Poppe himself
concedes that the class of indigent newcomers only nominally fits
the requirements for quasi-suspect status, 217 and that the
determination of "how much is enough" to qualify as a quasisuspect class is left entirely to the discretion of the Court.2 18 To
date, the Supreme Court has afforded quasi-suspect status to only
gender 219 and illegitimacy. 220
After the Court declined to
designate as quasi-suspect such classes as the mentally
challenged,2 2 1 which appears to almost meet the requirements for
a suspect class, it seems unlikely that the Court will extend the
protection of quasi-suspect classification to indigent newcomers.
Poppe rebuts this argument by asserting that "the Court did not
extend heightened review to the mentally retarded because
'legislation singling out the retarded for special treatment reflects
the real and undeniable differences between the retarded and
others."' 222
However, even if this is recognized as a valid
argument, lack of real differences is the only requirement for
classification as a suspect class that the mentally challenged
arguably did not meet. Indigent newcomers, in contrast, do not
readily meet any of the requirements.
The Court is not as
predisposed as Poppe to fit indigent newcomers into the mold of a
quasi-suspect class. 223
C. Rational Basis Reconsidered
There is an extreme urgency to the issue of durational
residency requirements as they relate to welfare benefits. This is

216. See supra note 194-198 and accompanying text (discussing Poppe's
approach).
217. See Poppe, supra note 155, at 314-15 (stating that the class of indigent
newcomers merely has more in common with groups already afforded quasi-suspect
status than with groups who have been denied quasi-suspect status).
218. See id. at 314 ('It is... impossible to predict with confidence how the Court
will rule in an individual case [in which quasi-suspect status is at issue].").
219. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724-25, 733
(1982) (applying a form of intermediate scrutiny and holding that denying males
enrollment in School of Nursing violates Equal Protection).
220. See, e.g., Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 97-102 (1982) (applying
intermediate scrutiny and holding that Texas' method of determining paternity
deprived illegitimate children of Equal Protection).
221. See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 432 (1985) (declining to
classify the mentally retarded as a quasi-suspect class).
222. Poppe, supra note 155, at 312 (quoting Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442-44).
223. This Article disagrees with Poppe on the feasibility of indigent newcomers
being classified as a suspect class; therefore, it is unnecessary to delve into Poppe's
analysis of durational residency requirement litigation under intermediate
scrutiny. See Poppe, supra note 155, at 317-23.

20001

RATIONAL BASIS WITH A BITE

237

not the kind of litigation where the people affected can await the
result of numerous appeals. When an individual or a family is
deprived of full welfare benefits for even a month or two, the
consequences can be severe, even deadly. Contrary to general
public opinion, it is difficult enough to survive on full welfare
benefits, let alone reduced ones. 224 The Court needs to set out a
straightforward standard for durational residency requirements
for welfare benefits that can be easily interpreted by Congress and
the state legislatures, and readily applied by the state courts.
Ironically, the Court may be able to send the strongest message by
using the most relaxed scrutiny.
The Saenz Court should have abandoned the constitutional
right to travel as a justification, and explicitly decided durational
residency requirement cases under equal protection, using a
By basing durational
rational basis standard of review. 225
residency requirement decisions solely on the doctrine of equal
protection, and applying minimal scrutiny accordingly, the Court
would have avoided the inherent problems in applying the
troublesome constitutional right to travel. 226 Furthermore, the
Court would ultimately provide better protection to indigent
persons than a questionably fundamental right.
Indeed, there were signs that the Court would make such a
change with Saenz. In its more recent durational residency
requirement decisions prior to Saenz, the Court had been moving
away from strict scrutiny and toward a rational basis standard of
review:
[T]he Supreme Court has appeared to subtly move away from
224. See Maldonado, 177 F.R.D. at 317-18 (describing the challenges facing the
Maldonados as they try to survive on either full or decreased benefits).
225. The rational basis test is the traditional standard of review for equal
protection cases not involving a fundamental right or a suspect or quasi-suspect
class. See JOHN E. NOWAK ET. AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.3, at 529-30 (3d ed.

1986).
226. But see Adler, supra note 25. Although Adler's analysis is technically
applicable only to noncitizens of a state, rather than newcomers, it is instructive
because most state legislatures seem to view indigent newcomers as noncitizens
and freeloaders. Adler argues that state legislators owe a "general duty of
impartiality" to outsiders. Id. at 391. He goes on to clarify that impartiality is not
the same thing as, but rather an alternative to, equal treatment. See id. at 394.
"Because state citizenship is not an empty concept, noncitizens do not have a
general right to equal treatment." Id. at 398. Adler's analysis points to some of the
pitfalls of adhering to equal protection rather than the constitutional right to travel
in durational residency requirement cases. See id. However, it is unlikely that the
Court would adopt a line of reasoning such as Adler's when applying equal
Nevertheless, Adler's brand of logic is
protection to indigent newcomers.
instructive when considering the viewpoint of the general public towards new
residents who are also would-be welfare recipients.

238
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Shapiro's fundamental rights analysis. Indeed, no majority of
the Court has used Shapiro's strict scrutiny since Maricopa,
and the Court has moved towards 227something of a rational
review test in right to migrate cases.

Right to travel jurisprudence had been repeatedly referred to as
"fractured;"228 one commentator remarked that "[t]he four opinions
in Zobel provide clear evidence of the Court's fractured view of
right to travel cases." 229 Scholars also predicted that Shapiro
would be limited the next time the issue of durational residency
requirements reached the Court, 230 and that "current social and
political conditions render inevitable a reconsideration of right to
travel jurisprudence." 23 1 However, the Court did not seize the
opportunity in Saenz to change its analysis of durational residency
requirements, as some had predicted it would.
The Court has approached all duraticnal residency
requirement litigation as right to travel cases. However, even
though there is no constitutional right to welfare benefits, cases
involving welfare benefits should be considered a cohesive, distinct
group. The Court has generally used minimum scrutiny in welfare
durational
residency
that
does
not involve
litigation
requirements. 232 Even if the Court chooses not to alter its level of
review in all durational residency requirement cases, it at least
makes sense for it to do so in cases involving welfare benefits.

227. Maldonado, 177 F.R.D. at 326.
228. Maldonado, 177 F.R.D. at 323 ('[T]he modern 'right to travel' jurisprudence
[is] an area of jurisprudence that is unsettled and clearly in need of clarification by
the United States Supreme Court. However, this Court cannot await a clarifying
decision by the Supreme Court but rather this Court must attempt to apply this
fractured area of law to the facts of this case.").
229. Donahue, supra note *,at 465. See also Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 56
(1982).
230. See, e.g., Binns, supra note 9, at 1273-74 (1996). Binns gives three possible
routes the Court might take when faced with a new durational residency
requirement case. First, she says, the Court could simply overrule Shapiro and
hold that using durational residency requirements to deter the migration of
indigent persons is constitutional.
Second, the court could find that some
durational residency requirements do serve a compelling state interest. Third (and
the possibility Binns considers most likely), the Court could find that durational
residency requirements do not impinge on the right to travel at all, and are
therefore permissible. See id.
231. Id. at 1266 (pointing to a recent trend in the judiciary back towards
formalism).
232. See Maldonado, 177 F.R.D. at 323 ("[T]here is no constitutional right to
public welfare assistance, and therefore a constitutional challenge to classifications
created by a state's welfare statute, standing alone, is subject to rational basis
review.") (citing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970)); supra notes 128141; see also Binns, supra note 9, at 1263-64 (discussing the effect of Dandridgeon
welfare litigation).
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Rational basis review becomes advantageous, rather than
ominous, for welfare rights supporters when it is considered in a
new light.
It is conceivable that the rational basis standard of review for
welfare durational residency requirement cases would not look like
the traditional rational basis test. The Court could apply a
"heightened" form of rational basis review. As one scholar said,
"although the [Zobel] Court purported to apply rational basis
review, its standard... [was] more [like] rational basis with a
bite."233 Other observers have also discussed the Supreme Court's

use of an enhanced form of rational basis review, 234 "enhanced"
primarily because in Zobel, the Court used rational basis review to
strike down a state statute. Experience reveals that generally,
once the Court decides to apply minimal scrutiny, a state statute
is nearly invincible. 23 5 Perhaps it is a new way of applying
rational basis review that makes it possible for the Court to use
this standard to declare a state statute unconstitutional. Or
233. Donahue, supra note *, at 464. At least one state has ventured into the
realm of enhanced rational basis review as well when dealing with its state equal
protection clause. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
Since the early eighties, this court has, in equal protection cases,
articulated a rational basis test that differs from the [usual] federal
standard, requiring- (1) the distinctions which separate those included
within the classification from those excluded must not be manifestly
arbitrary or fanciful but must be genuine and substantial, thereby
providing a natural and reasonable basis to justify legislation adapted to
peculiar conditions and needs; (2) the classification must be genuine or
relevant to the purpose of the law; that is there must be an evident
connection between the distinctive needs peculiar to the class and the
prescribed remedy; and (3) the purpose of the statute must be one that the
state can legitimately attempt to achieve.
State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 888 (Minn. 1991) (citing Wegan v. Village of
Lexington, 309 N.W.2d 273, 280 (Minn. 1981)); see also Mitchell v. Steffen, 504
N.W.2d 198, 209 (Minn. 1993) (Tomlajanovich, J., dissenting) (suggesting that
Minnesota has recognized a heightened rational basis test for nearly half a century,
since Loew v. Hagerle Bros., 33 N.W.2d 598 (Minn. 1948)). But see McKnight,
supra note 119, at 735 (arguing that the Minnesota rational basis review standard
is flawed, McKnight states that "in each case the court independently determined
whether the resulting statutory balance was satisfactory... , this practice places
great strain on the courts, statutory law, and constitutional theory.").
234. See Donahue, supra note *, at 464; see also Maldonado, 177 F.R.D. at 327
("Mhe Court appears to have established a different test, in the framework of
Equal Protection, to use in deciding right to travel cases. The Court has created a
rational basis review that has more punch than the typical rational review test.");
supra notes 128-141.
235. See RONALD D. ROTUNDA ET AL., 2 TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 18.3, at 322 (1986) (citing Tussman and tenBroek,
The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341, 366 (1949)) ('The United
States Supreme Court attempts to meet these difficulties by maintaining that it is
not its function, as it reviews legislation, to substitute its views about what is
desirable for that of the legislature.").
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perhaps there are some state statutes that are so egregiously
against constitutional commands that they cannot be tolerated,
even under minimal scrutiny. Durational residency requirements
for welfare benefits certainly seem to fit into the latter category. 236
Achieving this message through rational basis review, however,
depends on how the argument is framed.
If the Court does apply rational basis review to durational
residency requirements, it must send a clear message it does not
intend to make it easier for states to enact such laws. To the
contrary, the Court must be careful to send the message that in
applying rational basis review, it is stating that these
requirements do not even meet the test of rationality. The key to
the Court effectively transmitting this message is to give specific
examples of purposes asserted by the states for durational
residency requirements and explicitly state that they are not
legitimate (being careful to explicitly state that it is not an
exclusive listing of illegitimate state purposes). In fact, the Court
began to do this in Shapiro before it moved to its discussion of the
constitutional right to travel and its application of strict
scrutiny.237
The straightforwardness of rational basis review is perhaps
its most appealing quality in the area of durational residency
requirements for welfare benefits. Due to the seriousness of the
issue, as well as Congress' and state legislatures' history of
rebellion against the Court on this issue, there is a distinct need
for the Court to "cut states off at the pass,"238 so to speak: "[S]tate
236. This Article does not mean to suggest that the Court would be creating a
completely new standard of review by continuing in the vein it began in Zobel. The
Court is as likely to create an entirely new standard of review--"rational basis with
a bite"-as it is to create a new quasi-suspect class. Rather, this Article simply
suggests that rational basis review does not produce the same result in every case.
237. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969) ('[Elven under
traditional equal protection tests a classification of welfare applicants according to
whether they have lived in the State for one year would seem irrational and
unconstitutional."); supranotes 13-62 and accompanying text.
238. Furthermore, the Court needs to cut voters off at the pass, because voters
are (at least theoretically) the ones who fuel the state legislatures. See Binns,
supranote 9, at 1281.
[My argument] does not assert that the Supreme Court, or courts in
general, should function as a super-legislature, nor does it assert that
legislators and voters make irrational choices.
Rather, the argument
acknowledges that under some circumstances, voters make a rational
choice to remain uninformed. The individual voter assesses the costs
associated with becoming informed, and the benefits that are likely to
result. If the costs are too great, or the benefits too attenuated, the voter
will choose to remain uninformed. This 'rational ignorance' is confounded
when local governments choose local, short-term gains (fewer welfare
recipients in Wisconsin) despite the long-term negative effects (more
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legislators and politicians are likely to push the constitutional
limit ....
Although the Welfare Reform Act places greater
responsibility on individual states to fight the battle against
poverty, it does not necessarily give states any more resources
with which to fight."239 In other words, states consider themselves
in a desperate situation (although arguably not quite as desperate
as that of the welfare recipients they are trying to avoid
serving) 240, and will likely try anything to avoid becoming a
"welfare magnet." The Court needs to adopt an analysis that does
not rely on an enigmatic constitutional right, such as the right to
travel, to strike down durational residency requirements.
It could be argued that if the Court applied rational basis
review to durational residency requirement cases, it could trigger
a new "race" in which states attempt to create less and less
invidious durational residency requirements.
However, the
durational residency requirement in Saenz is already fairly
minimal. 241 If the Court had struck down Saenes requirement
using rational basis review, it is unlikely that states could have
devised a less intrusive requirement that would maintain any
degree of effectiveness.
Conclusion
Rational basis review may not be the ideal approach to
welfare litigation. Obviously, groups and individuals concerned
with the dissemination of welfare benefits will instinctively want
the receipt of those benefits to be protected by the most heightened
judicial review possible. However, as mentioned above, there is no
constitutional right to welfare benefits per se. The only way to
subject legislation affecting welfare benefits to strict scrutiny is to
link those benefits to some other fundamental right, such as the

poverty nationwide). The Court, then, is in a unique position to prevent
the future economic and social instability that could result from the choice
to ignore the growing underclass.
Id. Although this rationale has been used to further the argument that the Court
should apply strict scrutiny, it applies equally well to the argument that the Court
should adopt rational basis review.
239. Id. at 1268.
240. Justice Stevens points out in Saenz that California could achieve the same
$10.9 million savings it claimed its durational residency requirement was meant to
achieve by simply deducting 72 cents across the board from each welfare recipienes
monthly benefits. See Saenz v. Roe, 119 S.Ct. 1518, 1528 (1999).
241. See Roe v. Anderson, 134 F.3d 1400, 1401 (9th Cir. 1998) (describing the
durational residency requirement involved as one which limits new residents'
benefits for the first year they live in California to the amount they would have
received in their prior state of residence).
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right to travel. The right to travel, though, is premised on
extremely shaky grounds, and the Court appears to be moving
away from deciding durational residency requirement cases based
on such a right. Establishing a firm ground on which to base
durational residency requirement decisions, even if that ground
involves less strict judicial scrutiny, is preferable to continued
reliance on a so-called fundamental right whose origins are, at
best, ephemeral. Indeed, strict scrutiny did not prevent Congress
or the states from rolling over Shapiro. It seems unlikely that it
will stop them from challenging Saenz as well. If the Court does
not have to stretch, if it is able to simply say that restricting
welfare benefits with durational residency requirements can never
have a rational purpose, then it may send a stronger and more
definitive message to both Congress and the states. Although a
right to welfare benefits cannot be found anywhere in the
Constitution, there are certain measures that basic human
rationality will not allow. Depriving persons of the means for
survival should be one of those measures.

